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PUBLIC ACCESS VERSUS PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN
GENOMIC INFORMATION: WHAT IS THE PROPER ROLE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS?
JANICE M. MUELLER,

J.D.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Lauded as "the sine qua non of 21st-century biology,"' bioinformatics
(formerly referred to as computational biology) is a burgeoning discipline at the
intersection of information technology and the life sciences. 2 The February 2001
announcement of the complete sequencing of the human genome represents the
signature event in the relatively short history of bioinformatics.3 The central goal
of bioinformatics is to organize, analyze, and generally make sense of the massive
quantities of genetic data and information that resulted from this tremendous
scientific achievement.4
This article examines the proper role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in
bioinformatics. IPRs are property rights in intangible "knowledge goods," such as
inventions and discoveries, which convey to their owners the right to prevent
unauthorized uses of the identified property. Just as the owner of a parcel of land
has an exclusive possessory interest to prevent others from trespassing thereon, so
too does the owner of an intellectual property right have the power to prevent
unauthorized uses of her invention or discovery. For example, the owner of a
patent on a newly-synthesized life-saving chemical composition may make and sell
it herself, may exclude all manufacture, sale, or use of the drug by others, or may
choose to permit any number of licensees to manufacture and sell the drug for a
negotiated monetary fee.
Many have criticized the notion of establishing and enforcing any IPRs in the
fruits of the human genome project, characterizing it as an endeavor intended to

* Professor of Law and U.S. Patent Attorney, John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Ill. The author
welcomes comments and can be contacted at 312.427.2737 or by e-mail at 7mueller@jmls.edu.
1. Sylvia J. Spengler, Bioinformatics in the Information Age, 287 SCI. 1221, 1221 (2000).
2. See generally Brad Stone, Wanted: Hot Industry Seeks Super Geeks, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30,
2001, at 54; David S. Roos, Bioinformatics-Trying to Swim in a Sea of Data, 291 Sol. 1260 (2001);
Spengler, supra note 1; Teresa K. Atwood, The Babel ofBioinformatics; Identifying, Counting Genes,
290 ScI. 471 (2000); Nigel Williams, How to Get Databases Talking the Same Language (Movement to

Standardize and Coordinate Bioinformatics), 275 Sci. 301 (1997).
3. See generally J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 ScI. 1304
(2001); INT'L HUMAN GENOME SEQUENCING CONSORTIUM, Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the

Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860, 860-921 (2001).
4. An article published in 2001 reported that GenBank accommodates more than 10,0
nucleotides
of nucleic acid sequence data, a figure that is predicted to more than double in size every year. See
Roos, supra note 2, at 1260.
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benefit all mankind.5 Regardless of one's philosophical and economic views on
that larger question, which this article does not attempt to answer, many IPRs in
genomic material such as genes and gene fragments have already been obtained or
at least applied for by private sector firms. 6 This latter-day "gold rush" is ongoing
despite the parallel movement to put as much genetic information into the public
domain as possible.7
Given that IPRs already exist in genomic material and are likely to be
enforced (at least if it is economically rational to do so), the inquiry should shift to
consideration of the manner in which society can ensure unrestricted access and
use of the genetic data and information, for purposes of research and development
that leads to new innovation in health care-critically important therapeutics,
diagnostics, methods of streamlined drug screening, and the like. Any proposed
framework must balance the public health rationale for unrestricted access against
the possibility of damaging powerful incentives for investment in the research and
development leading to these innovations. This article does not purport to suggest
a single answer to this complex balancing of interests, but rather proposes several
different responses for further consideration.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the various forms of intellectual
property protection that are potentially relevant to bioinformatics research and
development. Part III specifically focuses on the issues of statutory subject matter
and the utility requirement of patentability as relevant to bioinformatics-related
inventions. Part IV surveys some of the possible responses to public access
concerns raised by the ownership of patents in the life sciences. Part V considers
how patent rights will intersect with the rise of industry standards in the life
sciences, which will likely proliferate through advances in bioinformatics as has
been the case in the electronics and computing industries.
II. FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN BIOINFORMATICS

A patent is generally the exclusionary mechanism of choice in bioinformatics,
by far the most powerful form of IPR. Patents are available in four broad
categories of subject matter: processes (e.g., methods), machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter. 8 For a discussion of bioinformatics, the two

5. Videotape: Dr. Francis S. Collins, Address at "At the Crossroads-Public/Private Priorities
Concerning Access to Genetic Information" (Oct. 21, 2002) (on file with the University of Maryland
School of Law, Thurgood Marshall Law Library).
6. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, DNA and Gene Sequence Patents (2000) (table listing top 15
holders of U.S. patents on genes and DNA sequences), at
http://www.pwcglobal.com/Extweb/industry.nsf/docid/5ACE2513FC2DC3C5852568E4005 IFBOE
(last visited May 19, 2003).
7. See, e.g., The SNP Consortium Ltd., available at http://snp.cshl.org (last visited May 19,
2003).
8. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (2000).
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categories of greatest relevance are probably methods and compositions of matter.
The latter form of patent protects products, while method patents protect the
processes for making and using products.
Patent protection is the most difficult form of protection to obtain because of
the rigorous criteria that patentable inventions must satisfy: they must be new (e.g.,
novel), 9 have utility (e.g., some practical use), 10 and be considered "non-obvious"
to a hypothetical "person having ordinary skill" in the technology in question at the
time the inventions were made. I Moreover, patent applications must provide a
written description of the invention in a manner that enables its manufacture and
use without undue experimentation, and 2U.S. patents must further disclose the
"best mode of carrying out the invention."'
Copyright protection is available for original (e.g., minimally creative) works
of authorship, such as literary works and compilations of data. Copyright
protection is much "thinner" than patent protection, but more easily obtained.
Copyright protects original works of authorship that are minimally creative. Bare
data- facts- are not copyrightable, but compilations of data may obtain "thin"
protection, insofar as1 3 the compilation reflects original selection, coordination, or
arrangement of data.
Because databases, as collections of fact arranged in some standard, noncreative order, such as numerical or alphabetical, generally do not qualify for
copyright protection, some legal regimes such as the European Union (EU) have
created a sui generis form of protection against copying of the contents of the
database.14 The European regulation provides a
right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been
qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in the
obtaining, verification, or presentation of the contents to prevent
extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part,
evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that
database.' 5

9. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 102(a), (e) & (g) (2000).
10. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 101. n.77 (2000).
11.See 35 U.S.C.S. § 103(a) (2000).
12. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 112 (2000).
13. See Feist Pubs. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991). The Court rejected the
"sweat of the brow," or "industrious collection" theory of copyright protection, and held that an
alphabetically-arranged white pages telephone directory was not sufficiently original to be protected as
a compilation. Id. at 359-60.
14. COUNCIL, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTIVE 96/9/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OF
THE COUNCIL OF II MARCH 1996 ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES, at Chapter 3 (1996),

available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/Contract/directive I(last visited May 19, 2003).
15. Id.
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The term of protection is fifteen years.1 6 Exceptions are recognized for
"private purpose" extractions and extraction for teaching or scientific research for
non-commercial purposes. Those entitled to claim the European database rights
must be EU nationals and companies/firms having a registered office or principal
place of business in EU.
In the U.S., database vendors have sought to protect the contents of their
databases from duplication by means of so-called "shrink wrap" or "click through"
licenses. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg upheld a "shrink wrap" license that prohibited
commercial use of the contents of a database. 17 Some bioinformatics firms such as
Human Genome Sciences, Inc. (HGS), Incyte, and Celera are maintaining
databases of genetic information as trade secrets and requiring users to enter into
subscription agreements in order to access the data.' 8 This form of Intellectual
Propery (IP) protection depends on maintaining secrecy and limiting access, and
does not protect against "reverse engineering" or independent development of the
same information.' 9 Trade secret rights also assume that the underlying
information is economically valuable because of its secrecy and is the subject of
reasonable efforts to preserve that secrecy.2
The remainder of this article focuses on patent protection, the area of greatest
controversy within bioinformatics IPRs.
III.

PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATrER AND THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT

This section considers the categories of patentable subject matter that pertain
to bioinformatics inventions, as well as the patentability requirement that these
inventions must possess a practical utility. Patents are the leading form of
protection for bioinformatics inventions. The prevailing view among the IP
community is that "virtually all aspects" of bioinformatics qualify as potentially
patentable subject matter, 2' assuming of course, the utility,22 novelty, 23 and nonobviousness 24 of the invention.

16. Id.
17. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
18. Information on these bioinformatics firms can be located at http://www.HGSI.com;
http://www.incyte.com; http://www.celera.com, respectively (all last visited May 19, 2003).
19. See, e.g., Pamela Samuleson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L. J. 1575, *1577 (2002), WL 111 YLJ 1575.

20. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
21. Teresa J. Welch, Identifying and Protecting the Intellectual Property Value of Bioinformatics
Inventions, PATENT STRATEGY & MGMT., (American Lawyer, New York, N.Y.), July 2002, at 1.
22. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Nevertheless, patenting in bioinformatics is still in its infancy. The published
literature indicates that since around 1990, approximately 125 bioinformatics
patents have issued. 25 Approximately 900 bioinformatics patent applications are
currently pending in United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) "Art
Unit" 1631, a special bioinformatics examining unit created in December 1999.26
What types of inventions are being patented in the bioinformatics realm? The
traditional view is that one cannot patent genetic information per se,27 but it is
possible (and increasingly common) to obtain patent protection on the tools that
manipulate, analyze, or apply such information. Many bioinformatics patents are
directed to such "research tools," which are often claimed as processes or methods.
These patents protect a method of performing a task by following a certain series
of steps. For example, tool patents have issued on protein modeling systems,
sequence alignment methods, combinatorial library systems, computer-aided
sequence visualization and analysis systems, and methods of testing new drug
candidates against diseases.28
Product patents are being obtained in genomic material in the form of nucleic
acid molecules, cloning vectors, recombinant expression cassettes, host cells,
proteins, and the like. It is axiomatic that one cannot patent "products of nature,"
such as a newly-discovered naturally-occurring mineral or a plant found in the
wild, because these discoveries are considered the handiwork of nature, or basic
building blocks of scientific progress that are free for all to study and use. Patents
are intended to protect the results of human manipulation of nature's bounty.
Thus, a naturally-occurring bacterium discovered in the root nodule of a tree is not
patentable, 29 but a bacterium that has been genetically-engineered to digest

25. Welch, supra note 21, at 3. The accuracy of this figure depends, of course, on one's definition
of "bioinformatics."
26. Welch, supra note 21, at 3; see also Douglas Steinberg, New PTO Unit Examines
Bioinformatics Applications, SCIENTIST, Nov. 27, 2000, available at http://www.thescientist.com/yr2000/nov/steinbergp8_001 127.html (last visited May 19, 2003); see also e-mail from
John Doll, USPTO, to Janice Mueller, Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School (Mar. 4,
2003, 04:36 EST) (on file with the author).
27. See Lawrence M. Sung, The Unblazed Trail: Bioinformatics and the Protection of Genetic
Knowledge, 8 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 261, 268 (2002).
28. Welch, supra note 21, at 2. For example, see U.S. Patent Application No. 20030005483
("Data Processing of the Maize Prolifera Genetic Sequence") (filed Jan. 2, 2003), which claims, inter
alia, a data processing system for altering prolifera levels in plants:
11. A data processing system, comprising: data representing at least one genetic sequence; a genetic
identification, analysis, or modeling computer program designed to govern the processing of such data;
a data processor having an output for storing or displaying data processing results, said data processor
containing said data and said program and executing instructions according to said program to process
said data or a contiguous subsequence thereof, and wherein said genetic sequence is: (i) at least 90%
sequence identical to a polynucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 1, or (ii) at least 95% sequence
identical to a polypeptide sequence of SEQ ID NO: 2, and wherein sequence identity is determined by
the GAP algorithm under default parameters.
29. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
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multiple components of spilled crude oil is patentable. 30 Thus, the human genome
as it exists in the human body is not patentable.
It is possible, however, to obtain patent protection on the products of isolation
and purification of genomic material. For example, patents have issued on
32
expressed sequence tags (ESTs), 3 1 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), full33
length genes such as the breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, x-ray
crystallographic structures, and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) arrays on
microchips. The theory is that the isolation, purification, manipulation, and so on
of a natural product can result in an invention that is sufficiently changed as to be
novel and non-obvious with respect to the natural product on which it was based. 4
Product patents are considered the most economically valuable, because they
protect against unauthorized use of the product for any purpose (in contrast with
process patents, which protect only the recited use or method).35 The controversy
for product patents in the life sciences often centers on the utility requirement. 36
Only one "substantial, specific and credible" utility need be established in order to
obtain a product patent.37 If a single utility is established, then the product patent
is granted and that product patent controls all later-discovered uses of the product,
at least under existing precedent.3a
Consider, for example, the controversial patent granted in February 2000 to
HGS of Rockville, Maryland on the gene that encodes the "CCR5" cell surface
receptor, now recognized as an entry point for the AIDS virus.39 When HGS filed
its patent application, it knew only that its discovery played a general role as a
receptor, or entry point into cells for foreign attacking organisms; the company
expected to exploit the patent primarily in the development of anti-inflammatory
therapies. 40 About a year after filing the patent application, independent research,
which was not the work of HGS, showed that the CCR5 receptor is a critical entry

30. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
31. A fragment of DNA which may be used to identify a particular gene. Allan C. Nunnally,
Commercialized Genetic Testing: The Role of CorporateBiotechnology in The New Genetic Age, 8

B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 306, *364 n.92 (2002), WL 8 BUJSTL 306.
32. Variations of a single base pair from a normal genetic sequence. Id. at *315.
33. Id. at *307 n.5.
34. See generally, In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
35. Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposalto Amend the Patent Code 35 USC § 287(C) to Allow
Health Care Providersto Examine Their Patients DNA, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 471, 478 (2002).
36. Julian David Forman, A Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnological
PatentApplications, 12 ALB. L. J. Sci. & TECH. 647, *661 (2002), WL 12 ALBLJST 647.
37. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg.

1092,

1094 (Jan. 5,

2001)

[hereinafter

Guidelines].
38. Id. at 1095.
39. See U.S. Pat. No. 6,025,154 ("Polynucleotides Encoding Human G-Protein Chemokine
Receptor HDGNRI0") (issued Feb. 15, 2000).

40. See id.
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point into cells for the AIDS virus. 4 ' Thus, the receptor may be a critically
important tool in researching treatments for AIDS/HIV. Since HGS owns the
patent on the receptor itself, and a product patent is understood to cover any use of
that product, it appears that HGS has the right to demand royalties from any AIDS
researcher whose work makes use of the patented receptor.4 2 The issue is whether
HGS deserves this windfall for later-discovered utilities not recognized by HGS
when it filed its patent application.
The assertion of utility is even more tenuous for the U.S. patents that have
been granted on fragments of complimentary DNA (cDNA) called ESTs and
SNPs.43 Many patent applications were filed that claimed these sequences but
asserted no specific utility for the genetic material. 4 In most cases, the sequence
was part of an as-yet unidentified full-length gene that coded for an as-yet
unidentified protein.4 5 Preliminary signals from the USPTO indicated that the
agency would set a very lenient standard for utility of ESTs and other genomic
inventions.4 6 Considerable public criticism ensued 4 7
The USPTO has since reversed its course and established much more
stringent utility standards for patenting ESTs. a 8 In January 2001 the agency issued
final utility examination guidelines that require the applicant to establish a
"specific, substantial, and credible" utility.49 Thus, a claim to a purified and
isolated cDNA sequence, without any asserted utility other than as a probe to find
the corresponding full-length gene, would likely not satisfy this standard. °
DNA molecules, isolated and purified from their natural state, are thus
potentially patentable as compositions of matter if the current "specific,

41. Donna M. Gitter, InternationalConflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in United
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exception, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, *1625-26 (2001), WL 76 NYULR 1623.
42. See Eliot Marshall, HIVExperts vs. Sequencers in Patent Race, 275 SCI. 1261, 1263 (1997). A
related issue is whether HGS should be entitled to "reach-through royalties" based on the marketplace
success of any commercial product, e.g., new drug, therapeutic, or the like developed through use of the
CCR5 research tool. in other words, if A is building a house and needs to use B's patented hammer,
does A pay B an up-front royalty based on some perceived value of A's use of the tool- the hammer- or
must A pay B an after-the-fact royalty based on some percentage of the economic value of the end
product- the house- when A later sells or rents the house?
43. Rochelle K. Seide et al., Drafting Claims For Biotechnology Inventions, 682 PLI/PAT 285,
*345-46 (2001), WL 682 PLI/PAT 285.
44. See id. at 304.
45. See id. at *303.
46. In February 1997, a USPTO official stated publicly that the agency had decided to allow
claims to ESTs based on their utility as probes for larger DNA sequences. See Gene Fragments
Patentable,Official Says, 275 SCI. 1055, 1055 (1997).
47. Guidelines, supra note 37 at 1092-97 ("Discussion of Public Comments.").
48. See generally Guidelines, supranote 37.
49. Id.
at 1094.
50. ld.
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substantial, and credible" utility standard is satisfied (and the molecule is novel and
non-obvious). Another, much more controversial avenue being explored by some
firms is an attempt to capture the informational value of the DNA sequence data,
51
which lies chiefly in its potential use as a template for future protein production.
The data itself, as descriptive matter, is not patentable per se, 52 but recent attempts
to capture the sequence data claim it in the form of a "data structure., 53 For
example, a U.S. patent application of HGS published in June 2002, claims, inter
alia, a computer readable medium having recorded thereon specified DNA
54
sequences.
Here we are reaching a gray area or transition between patents on tangible
molecules, and patents that attempt to capture the informational value of DNA
sequences; e.g., patents that claim a DNA sequence stored in a computer-readable
medium, such as a data structure.5 5 It remains to be seen whether the USPTO will
allow such claims. Extant Federal Circuit decisions in software cases such as In re
Lowry, 56 and the USPTO's approval of Beauregard claims 57 suggest that patent
51. See Rebecca Eisenberg, Molecules vs. Information: Should Patents Protect Both?, 8 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 190, 196-97 (2002) (noting that "knowing what the [DNA] sequence is- is becoming
more significant relative to the material value of having access to a molecule that embodies that
information. That is, the value of making and using the DNA molecule as a template for protein
production.").
52. See Sung, supra note 27, at 285 n.130 (noting that the sequence of base pairs making up a
DNA molecule is simply a property of the molecule, and like any other descriptive property, is not itself
patentable).
53. Symposium, Panel One: Intellectual Property and Genetic Science: The Legal Dilemmas, 51
AM. U. L. REV. 371, 388 (2002).
54. U.S. Patent Application No. 20020072595 ("Nucleotide Sequence of Escherichia coli
Pathogenicity Islands") (published June 13, 2002), availableat
http://appftl.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.html (last visited May 19, 2003). The representative
claims are:
29. Computer readable medium having recorded thereon one or more nucleotide sequences depicted in
SEQ ID NOs: I through 142, or nucleotide sequences at least 99.9% identical thereto.
30. Computer readable medium having recorded thereon a nucleotide sequence of at least one
uropathogenic E. coli J96 pathogenicity island open reading frame depicted in Tables I through 4,
or a complement thereof.
31. The computer readable medium of claim 29, wherein said medium is selected from the group
consisting of a floppy disc, a hard disc, random access memory (RAM), read only memory
(ROM), and CD-ROM.
32. The computer readable medium of claim 30, wherein said medium is selected from the group
consisting of a floppy disc, a hard disc, random access memory (RAM), read only memory
(ROM), and CD-ROM.
55. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 51.
56. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing USPTO rejection of claimed data structures as
obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103 and noting that claimed data structures are "physical entities that provide
increased efficiency in computer operation [, which] are not analogous to printed matter."). But see In
re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming USPTO rejection of claim to "data
structure" as not statutory subject matter within 35 U.S.C. 101, where court interpreted "data structure"
as "[a] physical or logical relationship among data elements, designed to support specific data
manipulation functions," which did "not imply a physical arrangement of the contents of a memory.").
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claims to DNA sequence data in the form of a tangible data structure might be
allowable. However, initial indications from the USPTO are that the agency views
claiming DNA sequence data per se as amounting to no more than "nonfunctional
descriptive matter," and on this basis will refuse patentability. 18
It is surely sensible to characterize the nucleotide sequence of a DNA
molecule as describing a property of that molecule, just as the molecular weight of
the molecule, because neither property can be the subject of a patent claim,
standing in isolation. On the other hand, should not the nucleotide sequence of a
DNA be viewed not merely as descriptive but rather as uniquely functional, to the
extent that the sequence operates as a genetic "blueprint" for the production of
proteins?
By this logic, a claim to the DNA molecule reciting a particular
nucleotide sequence that renders the molecule useful, novel and non-obvious over
the prior art (including DNA as it exists in the human body) is potentially
patentable. It is difficult to contend that that same sequence embodied as a novel
and non-obvious data structure is not also patentable subject matter. In particular,
there does not seem to be a rational distinction between permitting claims to data
structures that help computers operate more efficiently, as in Lowry, and claims to
data structures comprising nucleotide sequences that code for proteins having a
medically-beneficial use. The courts will have to sort out these difficult questions.
IV. ASSURING ACCESS TO PATENTED GENETIC MATERIAL

This section describes problems of access that have recently surfaced in the
milieu of patents and other IPRs on genetic material and information. The need for
unrestricted access to genetic materials and information that can be essential to the
development o f life-saving new drugs and therapies does not fit comfortably with
the notion that patents convey an absolute right to exclude others from all uses of
the patented material, no matter how altruistic the purpose of the use.
Patent itifringement is essentially a strict liability scheme. The patent
property right is very broad- a patent conveys to its owner the right to prohibit
any unauthorized "use" (or making or selling or offering for sale or importing) 59 of
the patented invention, without regard for the purpose of the use. It matters not if

57. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
58. See Michael P. Woodward, USPTO Supervisory Examiner, Bioinformatics & §101 (slide
presentation) at 6-7 (asserting that "nonfunctional descriptive material," including but not limited to
music, literary works, and compilations or mere arrangements of data, are not statutory subject matter),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/biochempharm/documents/woodward.pps (last visited
May 19, 2003); id. at 17 (asserting that claims to computer readable media with sequence data on it are
drawn to non-statutory descriptive matter). See also DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & UNITED STATES
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100 2106.htm (last visited May
19,2003).
59. 35 U.S.C.S. § 27 1(a) (2000); 35 U.S.C.S. § 154 (LEXIS Supp. 2002).
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the user was aware that the invention was protected by patent; no "copying" or
intentional imitation is required to infringe a patent.60 Similarly, it is not relevant
whether the unauthorized use of the invention was for commercial or non-profit
61
purposes.
Consider the example of a patented "research tool," such as a combinatorial
library or a receptor, used for the purpose of research and development of a new
drug product. Even though the tool is not a physical part of that end product, it is
an upstream input and therefore permission must be obtained from the patent
owner to use it. This requires obtaining a license, or permission to use the patented
invention without liability for infringement, assuming that the patent owner is
willing to grant such a license upon acceptable terms.
The profusion of patents on multiple tools or inputs needed in life sciences
research and development raises issues of cost, known variously as the "royalty
stacking," "patent thicket," or "patent web" problem.62 Such costs involve not
only the licensing fees paid to a plurality of patent owners, but also the transaction
costs incurred in having to obtain the needed permission from multiple sources of
upstream tools. 63 Some observers have gone so far as to forecast a "tragedy of the
anticommons" such a profusion of patents on upstream inputs or research tools,
that the downstream products will not be made, or that their development will be
materially slowed or hindered. 64
A number of potential approaches to ameliorate the problem of access to
patented materials have been proposed, including the implementation of
compulsory licensing, the federal governmental exercise of eminent domain and
"march-in" rights, and a revitalization of the moribund "experimental use" defense
to patent infringement.65
A. Compulsory Licensing
For purposes of discussion, compulsory patent licensing should be contrasted
to consensual or voluntary licensing. In a compulsory licensing regime, the

60. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 271 (2000).
61. See id.
62. Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001); Paul F. FehIner,
Biotech Research Tools, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 2000 at B9; Gregory J. Glover, Patents Thickets and
Innovation Markets Reviewed Antitrust Concerns Over the Life Sciences Sparked Recent Public
Hearings, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 2002 at CI0; Gretel Schueller, Researchers Establish Frequency of Use
of Genetically EngineeredFood, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, March 4, 2001 at 2.
63. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 699 (1998).
64. Id.at 698.
65. See also Sung, supra note 27, at 268 n. 17 (listing various remedies proposed to ameliorate the
detrimental effects of the issuance of unreasonably broad patent claims to nucleic acids based solely on
their chemical character).
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government can be petitioned to compel a patent owner to grant licenses to third
parties (e.g., generic drug companies) to make, use, and/or sell the patented
invention. Compulsory licensing generally contemplates some remuneration to the
patentee as compensation for the government-compelled use of the invention by
the licensee.66 The considerable difficulty of quantifying the amount of such
payment remains a leading argument against adoption of compulsory licensing,
however. Critics decry the fundamental inability of monetary payment to remedy
the loss of exclusivity that compelled patent licensing represents.
For these and other reasons, the U.S. historically has shunned compulsory
licensing.67 Opponents contend that the practice decimates the economic value of
patents because it destroys the exclusivity that they represent; e.g., the right to
exclude all others from use or manufacture of the invention.68
Nevertheless, the U.S. is a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement, the key IP
treaty administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 69 TRIPS permits
member states to implement compulsory licensing systems under certain
prescribed conditions. 70 Thus, even though the U.S. has not enacted compulsory
licensing legislation (other than in a few very narrow exceptions such as the BayhDole "march-in" right described below), it must recognize that many other
countries can and do.7 '

66. WTO, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS) Art. 31(h),

available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs (requiring that "the right
holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the
economic value of the authorization .... ) [hereinafter TRIPS].
67. E.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (describing
compulsory licensing as "rarity" in U.S. patent system); see also EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 172 (1951) (explaining that compulsory
licensing has been "violently opposed" in the U.S. because it "can be such a serious derogation of the
monopoly 'rights' of the patentee"); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 396 (1970) ("[E]very attempt to alter the U.S. law in this direction [of introducing
general compulsory licensing provisions] has been beaten down as a result of determined opposition
from industrial groups and the patent bar."); Irving N. Feit, Biotechnology Research and the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 819, 840
n.102 (1989) (characterizing U.S. policy as "not favoring compulsory licenses."); Evelyn H.
McConathy & Clifford K. Weber, Committee Report: University and Government IP Issues, 2000 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N BULL. 177, 178 (describing compulsory licensing as "abhorrent to both
academia and industry"); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 811 (1990) (describing compulsory licensing as "anathema" to U.S.
patent law). Congress considered but ultimately dropped the idea of compulsory licensing as part of the
1952 Patent Act. Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 215 n.2 1.
68. Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift TowardCompulsory
Licensing, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 236, 244-47 (2002).
69. TRIPS, supra note 66.
70. Id. at Art. 31.
71. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 203 (2000).
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For example, the implementation of compulsory licensing to provide access
to patented medicines is very much at the forefront of the "north-south" debate.72
The compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS continue to provoke vocal debate
between developed countries like the U.S., which generally oppose compulsory
licensing as weakening the economic value of patents, and the developing world
and least developed countries, which see the possibility of compulsory licensing as
essential to public health and the eradication of disease and malnutrition. 7
The most recent example of the compulsory licensing controversy is the
continued fallout from the "Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health," adopted in November 2001 at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha,
Qatar. 74 The Declaration recognizes that least-developed member countries
without significant domestic manufacturing capacity would have a difficult time
making effective use of compulsory licensing under TRIPS.75 TRIPS requires that
the manufacture of generic medicines made under compulsory licensing be
"primarily for the supply of the domestic market, ' '76 which would appear to
prohibit extensive exportation. Based on this TRIPS provision, the U.S. has
strongly opposed the exportation of patented drugs made by generic manufacturers
in developing countries such as India, China, and Brazil to the least developed
countries.77
B. Eminent Domain
Governmental exercise of eminent domain power to condemn patented
property is closely related to compulsory licensing. In eminent domain, rather than

72. Avedissian, supranote 68, at 244-58.
73. Id.
74. The text of the Doha declaration on TRIPS and public health is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist-e/min0le/mindecl-trips e.htm (last visited May 19,
2002).
75. Seeid. at 6.
76. TRIPS, supra note 66, at Art. 31(f).
77. See THE N.Y. TIMES, A Global Medicine Deal (Editorial) (Jan. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/06/opinion/06MON2Y.html?pagewanted=print&position-top.
See
also U.S. Holds Out Against Allowing Compulsory Licensing of Patented Drugs For Export and
Announces Moratorium On TRIPS Enforcement, DAILY NEWS (Dec. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.IPO.org/2002/DailyNewsChron2O02.:
On Friday at the World Trade Organization in Geneva, after months of negotiation, the United States
maintained its position as the lone holdout to an agreement for compulsory licensing of patented drugs
for export to developing countries. The current TRIPS agreement allows compulsory licensing only
when it is predominantly for the domestic market. The U.S. insisted that compulsory licensing for
export must be limited to drugs to treat infectious epidemics such as AIDS, malaria, and TB. A U.S. list
covering 23 such diseases was not accepted. The impasse means the WTO will not meet its Dec. 31
deadline for agreement on implementing the 2001 Doha Public Health Declaration. Late Friday the U.S.
Trade Representative announced (www.ustr.gov) that as an interim measure the U.S. will observe a
moratorium on using WTO dispute settlement procedures to prevent compulsory licensing for export
"to help poor countries get access to emergency life-saving drugs."
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compelling the patentee to license a third party, the government itself is the
licensee. When the U.S. government needs to procure technology that is the
subject of another's patent (e.g., a proprietary weapons system or an antibiotic or
vaccine for the treatment or prevention of a disease), federal law provides that the
government can manufacture and use the patented invention itself, or (more
typically) the government can acquire and use the patented invention from a
nonlicensed supplier, without being enjoined.78
The government's use of the patented invention is construed as a takinge.g., the condemnation of a patent license under Fifth Amendment principles. 79 As
with all such takings, the government must pay "just compensation" for the
property taken. 80 Historically this has meant awarding the patentee damages for
the taking in the form of a reasonable royalty.81
Thus, the grant of a U.S. patent is always subject to a nonexclusive but
royalty-bearing license in the federal government. 82 Having waived its sovereign
immunity from patent infringement, the government assumes any potential patent
infringement liability on the part of its suppliers through clauses in its procurement
contracts.83
Under this framework the federal government would have the absolute power
to make and use, or have manufactured for it, a bioinformatics invention patented
by a private firm. It seems unlikely that the government would exercise this
power, however, except in a public health crisis of severe proportions. During the
anthrax scare of 2001, the U.S. government threatened, but ultimately declined to
exercise, its eminent domain power to manufacture the antibiotic CIPRO, patented
by Bayer Corporation.8 a
C. March-In Rights
The Bayh-Dole Act,85 enacted in 1980, created statutory authority for yet
another form of compulsory licensing- the possibility of obtaining a compulsory
license to practice patented inventions made with federal funds. The Bayh-Dole
Act was intended to encourage non-profit entities such as universities and small

78. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1498 (LEXIS Supp. 2002) (providing a cause of action against the U.S. to the
patent holder).
79. See Decca Ltd. v. U.S., 640 F.2d 1156, 1166 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
81. Decca Ltd., 640 F.2d at 1167; Leesona Corp. v. U.S., 599 F.2d 958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
Reasonable royalty awards are evaluated under the multiple factors of Georgia-PacificCorp. v. U.S.
Plywood-Champion Papers,Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
82. See Leesona Corp., 599 F.2d 958; Decca Ltd., 640 F.2d 1156.
83. See 28 U.S.C.S § 1498(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2002).
84. Avedissian, supra note 68, at 258-59 (2002); A Global Medicine Deal, supra note 77.
85. 35 U.S.C.S. §§ 200-212 (2000).
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86
businesses to patent their "subject inventions" made with government funds.
These patents are often owned by non-profits such as universities and exclusively
licensed to for-profit corporations, which bear the primary cost of
commercialization and are unlikely to make the required investment without an
exclusive license.87
The Bayh-Dole Act provided for the exercise by the government of so-called
"march-in" rights in the event that this scheme does not provide for sufficient
supply of a subject invention. 88 If the government determines that either the
patentee or its licensee is not reasonably satisfying "health or safety needs," the
government can compel the patentee to grant licenses to additional third-party
applicants, or if patentee refuses to do so, the government itself can grant such
licenses, eliminating the formerly exclusive nature of the licensee's access.89
Similar to the eminent domain strategy described above, it is unlikely that the
government will exercise its march-in rights except in the case of a severe public
health calamity. In fact, following the enactment of Bayh-Dole in 1980, the U.S.
government has never exercised its march-in rights to compel the licensing of any
90
federally funded invention.

D. Revamping the Research Use Exemption to Patent Infringement
Other proposals suggest that the U.S. recognize a meaningful research (or
"experimental") use exemption from patent infringement liability. 91 With one
very narrow exception,92 no U.S. statute provides for an exception to utility patent
infringement liability when the use in question is for experimental or research
purposes. There is no "fair use" provision in the U.S. Patent Act, in contrast with
the U.S. Copyright Act, 93 although many academic researchers appear to assume
otherwise.94
U.S. judicial decisions grudgingly recognize a common law

86. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 203 (2000). "Subject inventions" are those inventions conceived or reduced
to practice under a government funding agreement. Under subsection (c)(4), the government retains a
nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for/on behalf of
the government the subject invention.
87. See M. Patricia Thayer & Richard A. De Liberty, The Research Exemption to Patent
Infringement: The Time Has Come for Legislation, 4 J. BIOLAW & Bus. 1, 17 (2000).
88. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 203 (2000).
89. Id.
90. See Johns Hopkins v. Cellpro, 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
91. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 62; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
92. 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (providing that use of a patented invention solely for purposes
reasonably related to gathering data to support an FDA application for generic versions of previously
approved drugs (e.g., an Abbreviated New Drug Application) is not patent infringement).
93. 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (2000), amended by 17 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LEXIS Supp. 2002).
94. Thayer & De Liberty, supra note 87, at 15 (stating that "[m]any research scientists never
question that a patent infringement lawsuit could be brought to stop scientific experiments.").
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experimental use exception but narrowly limit its applicability
to research use that
95
is strictly philosophical or for amusement or curiosity.
The Federal Circuit's most recent pronouncement on the experimental use
doctrine, Madey v. Duke University,96 demonstrates just how "very narrow" and
"strictly limited" the courts perceive the research use exemption to be. As a
faculty member at Duke, Dr. Madey ran the University's Free Electron Laser
research laboratory (FEL) from 1989 to 1997. 9 Dr. Madey was the sole named
inventor and owner of two U.S. patents that were practiced by operation of some of
the equipment in the FEL lab in ongoing research projects.98 After Madey
resigned over an employment dispute, Duke continued to operate the patented
equipment. 99
When Madey subsequently sued the University for patent
infringement, a federal district court granted partial summary judgment to Duke,
which had asserted the defense of non-liability based on experimental use. 100
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court
had "attached too great a weight to the non-profit, educational status of Duke,
effectively suppressing the fact that Duke's acts appear to be in accordance with
any reasonable interpretation of Duke's legitimate business objectives."' 0 ' The
appellate court recognized that major research universities like Duke often conduct
basic research with arguably no commercial application. 0 2 However, the court
concluded, "these projects unmistakably further the institution's legitimate
business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty
participating in these projects [, which] also serve . . to increase the status of the
10 3
institution and lure lucrative research grants, students, and faculty."'
In sharp contrast with the American disfavor of an experimental use
exception to patent infringement, foreign patent codes generally include statutory
general exemptions for research. For example, the proposed European Community
Patent Convention would exclude from the effects of a Community patent those
acts "done privately and for non-commercial purposes," and those "acts done for
' 4
experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention."'

95. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216
F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
96. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 1352-53.
98. Id.at1352.
99. Id.at 1353.
100. Id. at 1355.
101. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. COMM'N EUROPEAN CMTYS, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE COMMUNITY
PATENT (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/en/indprop/patent/412en.pdf
(last visited May 19, 2002). The proposed regulation provides for the grant of a unitary "Community
patent" of equal effect throughout the European Community. Id.§ 2.4.1, at 9 ("Explanatory
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Domestic statutes of many European countries and Japan similarly contain
research use exemptions. 105
V. INTERSECTION OF BIOINFORMATICS PATENT RIGHTS AND INDUSTRY
STANDARDS

This part examines the implications of IPRs in the subject matter of "industry
standards," and the manner in which the assertion of such rights may impact
bioinformatics research and development.
0 7
Industry standards (both de facto0 6 and de jure1
) have proliferated in the
computing, communications, and entertainment sectors, where they help to ensure
product interoperability, connectivity, and safety. Consider, for example, the
typical 3.5-inch floppy disk relied on by computer users as a data storage medium.
Although manufactured by many different companies, these disks have standard
dimensions and other physical specifications that permit them to be used in any
manufacturer's computer.

Memorandum").
A newly-created, centralized "Community Intellectual Property Court" with
Community-wide jurisdiction will determine enforcement and validity questions. Id. § 2.4.5.1, at 13.
The proposed regulation on the Community patent is independent from the European Patent Convention
(EPC), which was signed in 1973. Id. § 1.1, at 4. The EPC provides a single procedure for the
examination of patent applications in the European Patent Office. Id. Once a European patent has been
granted, however, it becomes a national patent in each member country designated by the applicant, and
is subject to the patent laws of each such designated country. Id. The EPC does not provide any
Community-wide enforcement forum; rather, any infringement of a European patent "shall be dealt
with by national law." Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Art. 64(3), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar64.html (last modified Nov. 8, 2000).
105. For example, French law provides that "[aicts accomplished for personal or domestic purposes
or for the purpose of testing the object of the patented invention shall not be considered as affecting the
patentee's rights." See French Patent Law Including Modifications of 1978, Art. 29, reprintedin JOHN
P. SINNOTIr ET AL., WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, PAT. STATUTES, REGS. AND TREATIES, 2D, at
FRANCE-9 (LexisNexis, Mathew Bender 1999) [hereinafter WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE].
Germany provides that the "effects of the patent shall not extend to ... acts done for experimental
purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention." See German Patent Act of 16
December 1980, § 11.2, reprinted in WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra at WEST
GERMANY-78.22. Great Britain exempts from infringement liability those acts "done privately and
for purposes which are not commercial" as well as those acts "done for experimental purposes relating
to the subject-matter of the invention." See Patent Act 1977, § 60(5), reprintedin WORLD PATENT LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra at GREAT BRITAIN-269. The Japanese patent laws provide that "[t]he effects
of the patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent right for the purposes of experiment or
research." See Japanese Patent Law of 1959, as amended through May 6, 1998, effective June 1, 1998,
§ 69(1), reprintedin WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra at JAPAN- 194.
106. Defacto standards are not promulgated by any particular body, but rather arise spontaneously
due to marketplace success. The Microsoft WINDOWS operating system is an example of a defacto
industry standard for personal computers.
107. Dejure standards are those promulgated by some official body, whether it be the government,
an academic consortium, or an industry working group. Examples of the latter include the World Wide
Web Consortium and the Intemet Engineering Task Force.
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In the life sciences, standards are much less evolved. They are beginning to
be developed, however, in the context of attempts to standardize or harmonize
different types of genetic data formats such as CORBA, the Common Object
Request Broker Architecture.' 1 8 Standards are also being developed for cDNA
micro array analysis of gene expression (e.g., gene chips).' 0 9
As industry standards are developed in the life sciences, the information
generated by bioinformatics research and development is easier to access and use
and thus much more valuable. But the assertion of proprietary rights in the subject
matter of industry standards can generate an undesirable "lock-in.""10 Once
numerous applications are developed that run on a particular standard and a certain
"tipping point" of adoptions is reached, it is unlikely that the tide can be changed,
and that particular standard will remain "locked in." The switching costs are
simply too high to migrate to a new standard.
In the special case where an individual or firm possesses patent, copyright, or
other IPR in the technology that has become an industry standard, the economic
potential that the patent represents is greatly magnified. Anyone who wants to
comply with the standard will have to pay tribute to the patent owner; e.g., obtain a
license (if available). Consider a hypothetical in which a private firm obtains
patent protection in a computer-implemented system that utilizes proprietary
algorithms for gene sequencing. Should this system be marketed and become the
industry standard, any other firms desiring to exploit the same system (including
the algorithms) would require a patent license.
As a threshold matter, it is not intuitively obvious that IPRs can exist in de
jure industry-wide standards. How can any single entity have ownership in such a
standard? It has happened in the electronics industry, where it led to litigation and
Federal Trade Commission investigation."' Sometimes consortium members that
consider and set standards are not aware of pre-existing IP rights in the technology
they select or adopt. Sometimes the standard-setting participants themselves may
actively attempt to steer a developing standard in a particular direction, while
failing to disclose that they have underlying proprietary rights in that technology.
For these reasons it is imperative that all participants in bioinformaticsrelated standard-setting make full, up-front disclosure of IPRs, so that the standardsetting body can make a fully informed choice as to whether to base the standard
on that proprietary technology." 2 This should include disclosure of pending patent
applications as well as issued patents. Most electronics and Internet industry

108. See Spengler, supra note 1, at 1223.

109. Id. at 1221.
110. See Dan Burk, Open Source Genomics, 8 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 254, 257-58 (2001).
111. See generally Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed Cir. 2003); Micron v.
Rambus, 189 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D. Del. 2002); In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
112. See generally Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002).
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standard-setting organizations have adopted their own policies requiring disclosure
of proprietary rights," 3 but no law mandates that they do so, and the disclosure
rules are far from uniform.
More difficult to resolve is the case of an IP owner that does not participate in
standard setting, but later comes forward to assert its patent against users of the
standard. The IP owner arguably cannot be bound by contractual obligations of
which it had no notice, and to which it was not a party, yet its refusal to license its
patented technology on terms agreeable to standards users can result in a difficult
"hold-up" problem. If challenged in litigation by standards users, the patent might
be invalidated and/or held unenforceable, or if not, the patentee might be ordered
to license at royalty-free, or "reasonable and nondiscriminatory," terms. Yet, none
are just
of these outcomes is by any means certain or inexpensive, as courts
4
beginning to grapple with the impact of IPRs on industry standards."]
In some industries like electronics and aviation, patent owners have "pooled"
their patents in a way that allows manufacturers to obtain a "package license"
giving them permission to make and use all the patented inventions in the pool for
a particular fee. 15 Pools were first created in the aviation and sewing machine
industries, and have occurred more recently with DVD technology, with MPEG2
data compression technology, and with the patents needed to perform LASIK eye
6

surgery." 1

Patent pooling has not yet occurred to any reported extent in bioinformatics,
but some commentators have predicted that it will." 7 Others disagree that patent
pooling is a viable solution to the access concerns in life sciences patenting." 8
VI. CONCLUSION

Attempts to patent bioinformatics-generated inventions will likely continue
and expand beyond current levels. The USPTO and the courts have not yet
grappled with the unique aspects of this technology at the intersection of

113. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard- Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1889 (2002).
114. See, e.g., Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 2000 WL 433505 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1011; In re Dell, 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
115. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Genes & Patent Policy: Rethink Intellectual Property Rights, 3
NATURE 803 (2002); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: IntellectualProperty Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, * 1340-43 (1996), WL 84 CALR 1293.
116. See e.g., Steven C. Carlson, PatentPools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359,
*368-71 (1999), WL 16 YJR 359.
117. See JEANNE CLARK ET AL., USPTO, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? (2000), availableat
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf (last visited May 19, 2002).
118. See generally Bradley J. Levang, Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A
Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. *229 (2002), WL 19 SCCHITLJ 229.
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biotechnology and the information sciences. Private firms are beginning to shift
from utilizing patents as a means of obtaining proprietary rights in particular
molecules, to their use as a vehicle to capture the informational value of genetic
sequence information. Attempts to apply existing patentability rules developed for
precursor technologies such as computer software-implemented business methods
or chemical compounds to these new methods and products may be problematic.
As innovative constructs of patent protection evolve for bioinformaticsgenerated inventions, the availability of such protection will help to guarantee
continued investment in bioinformatics research and development. But in its
incentivizing role the patent system must not ignore the need to ensure reasonable
access to those products and methods. The public health and welfare promise held
by bioinformatics is simply too great to permit the fruits of this technology to be
effectively suppressed through the assertion of patent rights. This article has
identified several "safety valves" or checks on the patent system, such as
compulsory licensing and the research use exemption, that should be evaluated by
policy-makers as possible means of ensuring that research and development in
bioinformatics reaches its full potential without significant impediment.

